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Deliberate Discretion? : The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy / John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan
(Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)

出版者 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press)
出版年 2002
大きさ 1 online resource (304 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
書誌ID MC00006915

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eBook オンライン資料

MC000046401
Cambridge University Press online books 9780511804915

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一般注記 Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Jul 2017).
The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.
著者標目 *Huber, John D. author
Shipan, Charles R. author
件 名 LCSH:Separation of powers
LCSH:Political planning
LCSH:Bureaucracy
LCSH:Law and politics
LCSH:Comparative government
分 類 LCC:JF229
DC21:320/.6
資料種別 機械可読データファイル
巻冊次 ISBN:9780511804915
XISBN:9780521817448
XISBN:9780521520706